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This box contains the update to the Banco de España’s 
macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy published 
on 15 June,1 including information that has become available 
since then. Specifically, the projections presented here incorporate 
the preliminary results of the Quarterly National Accounts for the 
second quarter of 2017, and the changes observed in the 
assumptions on which the projections are based (see Table 1).2
The current projections foresee the growth phase that began in 
late 2013 continuing over the period 2018‑2020. This outlook for a 
continuation of the current economic expansion is supported by 
progress on correcting macro‑financial imbalances. In particular, 
the economy’s competitiveness gains have allowed the 
composition of GDP to be refocused from the demand‑side 
perspective towards exports, making it possible for the expansion 
of activity and reduction of prevailing high levels of unemployment 
to be compatible with maintaining an external surplus. At the same 
time, private agents have been able to reconcile their spending 
plans with a reduction in their debt.
Against this positive backdrop, it is expected that the economy 
will continue to grow at above its potential rate, supported by the 
expansionary stance of demand‑side policies, as reflected in the 
persistence of the accommodative monetary policy stance and, in 
the short term, the budgetary policy measures set out in the 2018 
State Budget.
Nevertheless, it is expected that output growth will tend to 
moderate over the course of the projection horizon. From the 
standpoint of demand‑side policies, the projected upturn in euro‑
area inflation resulting from the gradual widening of the output gap, 
reduces the likelihood of there being additional monetary stimulus, 
although the effects of the monetary policy measures implemented 
in recent years will continue to be felt. Additionally, the projection 
exercise assumes that the expansionary fiscal policy measures 
adopted in the first half of the year will support growth over the 
period 2018‑2019, while in the absence of medium‑term budgetary 
plans, fiscal policy is assumed to take a neutral stance in the final 
year of the projection. Lastly, the household saving rate is expected 
to recover from its current levels close to its all‑time low, leading to 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020)
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Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 14 September 2018. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated based on the 
relevant annual averages.
b Differences are between rates in the case of world output and export markets, between levels in the case of oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, 
percentage differences for the effective nominal exchange rate and percentage point differences in the case of interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018‑2020): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise.
2  The June publication was based on the information for the variables 
underlying the forecasts available as at 22 May. In the case of the current 
projections, the information referring to developments in Spain’s export 
markets is that prepared by ECB staff for the publication of the ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2018, for 
which the cut‑off date was 21 August. For their part, the data on the 
remainder of the assumptions used in preparation of the projections 
were updated on 14 September. Finally, information available as at 21 
September was used in the preparation of the projections. However, 
explicit use has not been made of the information in the revised Annual 
National Accounts published by the National Statistics Office (INE) on 6 
September. The reason is that the models used to prepare the projections 
require quarterly series, and on the cut‑off date for these projections 
quarterly series consistent with the latest annual information were not 
yet available.
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a further moderation in consumer spending in addition to that seen 
since 2017. The short‑term information available suggests that 
GDP growth in the third quarter may have been 0.6%, as in the 
second quarter. The slight growth moderation forecast for the 
following quarters would slow output growth from 2.6% in 2018 to 
2.2% and 2% in each of the two following years.
Inflation is projected to follow a downward path in annual average 
HICP growth terms over the projection horizon, with rates of 1.8%, 
1.7% and 1.5%, respectively, in each of the three years 
considered.3 This downward trajectory of the headline indicator is 
mainly driven by the slowdown in the energy component, primarily 
explained by the downward oil futures curve. By contrast, the core 
inflation component is expected to pick up as the period in which 
output is expanding at above its trend rate continues and leads to 
ever higher capacity utilisation. Specifically, HICP excluding 
energy and food, is projected to rise by 1% this year, before 
accelerating to 1.4% and 1.8% in the following two years.
Overall, relative to the June projections, the changes in the 
assumptions underlying the forecast have a negative impact on 
activity and an approximately neutral impact on prices. The most 
significant change in the assumptions is the markedly less dynamic 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
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Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA data: 2018 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 21 September 2018.
b The rates of change in 2017 that refer to the National Accounts series have been updated to include the revision of the Annnual National Accounts for the years 
2015-2017 published by the INE on 6 September. The new figures for net lending / net borrowing of the nation and of the general government will be published 
on 28 September.
3  Until recently, the benchmark variables used by the Directorate General 
Economics, Statistics and Research (DGEE) of the Banco de España to 
analyse and forecast the behaviour of consumer prices in Spain were the 
national definition of the consumer price index (CPI) and an index
   derived from it by excluding prices of energy and unprocessed food, as 
an accompanying measure of core inflation (IPSEBENE, by its Spanish 
abbreviation). The note “Reference variables for analysing inflation in 
Spain” explains why the DGEE opted to replace the previous measures 
by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), as an overall 
measure of changes in consumer prices, and the indicator derived from 
it excluding energy and food prices, as a measure of changes in core 
inflation.
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performance of export markets, with expected growth 1.5 pp 
lower in cumulative terms over the period 2018‑2020 than was 
projected three months ago. This deterioration in the outlook for 
global trade and activity is more pronounced in the case of the 
more vulnerable emerging market economies, which have started 
to feel the effects of the uncertainty generated by the successive 
announcements of the introduction of protectionist measures, and 
also of the tightening financial conditions in these economies, 
resulting from the shift towards a less expansionary monetary 
policy stance in the United States.4 Moreover, measured in euro, 
the oil price is now projected to be higher in 2019 and 2020, which 
also helps explain the weakening of the Spanish economy’s 
momentum compared to the June projections. Conversely, the 
downward revision of short and long‑term interest rates, in line 
with the expectations implicit in the yield curves, results in a slight 
cheapening of lending to households, according to the equations 
linking bank lending rates to these market rates.
There are only minor changes to the public finance assumptions over 
the projection horizon compared to the previous exercise. Fiscal 
policy projections for 2018 are based on measures adopted in the 
budgets of the various different tiers of government for this year,5 
together with the available information on their execution. As regards 
the assumptions for the remainder of the projection horizon, on the 
cut‑off date for these projections, the draft 2019 State and Social 
Security budget had not been submitted. This being the case, we 
opted to use various technical assumptions to estimate the fiscal 
variables for the period 2019‑2020. First, the impact of the measures 
approved in 2018, but with effects on the following years, was 
considered, such as the 2019 pension increase of 1.6% adopted in 
the 2018 State budget, the public sector employment and salary 
agreement between the government and main unions in the sector 
for the period 2018‑2020, and the deferred effects of changes in 
personal income tax regulations. Second, it was assumed that those 
budgetary items subject to greater discretionality – such as public 
investment and procurement, in particular, given their volume – will 
grow in line with the nominal growth potential of the Spanish 
economy.6 Finally, it was assumed that, in the absence of specific 
measures, the course of the remaining items in the general 
government accounts will be shaped by the usual factors.7
According to these assumptions and forecasts of the fiscal policy 
variables and the output gap estimated in a way consistent with 
the other macroeconomic projections, the fiscal policy stance is 
expected to be expansionary in 2018 and 2019, after its 
approximately neutral stance in 2017.
Current GDP growth projections entail downward revisions from 
the previous projection of 0.1 pp, 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp in 2018, 2019 
and 2020, respectively. The scale of the revision is similar to that 
which, based on historical evidence, would derive from the impact 
of the changes in the various assumptions shaping the projection.8 
This is mainly a consequence of the worsening outlook for 
developments in Spain’s export markets and, to a lesser extent, 
rising oil prices. By contrast, the further cut in the cost of borrowing 
by private agents exerts a slightly expansionary effect.
As in the case of GDP, the sign of the revision of the main demand 
components is also negative in cumulative terms over the 
projection horizon as a whole.9 First, the worse expected 
performance of export markets translates into less buoyant 
exports. Also, the drop in external demand and the adverse effects 
of the increased uncertainty from the international environment on 
private agents’ spending decisions have led to a slight downward 
revision of the main components of domestic demand. In turn, 
weaker final demand goes hand in hand with weaker imports.
Regarding inflation, the current projections for HICP growth represent 
a downward revision of 0.2 pp in 2018 and of 0.1 pp in 2020, while 
the annual average projected for 2019 remains unchanged. These 
relatively modest revisions are influenced by a combination of factors 
of opposite signs. Specifically, the energy component has been 
revised up over the entire projection horizon. In the near term, this is 
because, in recent months, energy prices have shown a more 
dynamic performance than was estimated in the previous projection 
exercise, while the higher energy goods inflation expected over the 
rest of the projection horizon is due to the higher expected levels of 
crude prices according to the futures markets. The projections for 
the core HICP component (which excludes energy and food prices) 
have been revised down as a result of the weaker demand 
momentum and the recent forecasting errors in this component, 
especially as regards services, which suggest that the response of 
inflation to the widening of the output gap could be more moderate 
than foreseen to date in the projections.
As has been the case since the start of the recovery, expenditure 
on consumer goods and services is expected to continue to be 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
4  See Box 2 (Recent turbulence in emerging markets) in this edition of the 
Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
5  For a detailed description, see Box  5 of the Quarterly report on the 
Spanish economy 2/2018 (June).
6  In a similar vein, the general government investment forecast for 2019 
includes the estimate stated in the Stability Programme 2018‑2021 of 
income in the order of €1 billion for the re‑tendering of toll motorways 
that were taken under government management as a result of the 
bankruptcy proceedings this year.
7  Specifically, it is assumed that government revenue will grow in line with 
tax bases, which mainly depend on the macroeconomic context. Similar 
assumptions are made for those less discretionary expenditure items. 
This is the case of pensions (basically driven by population ageing and, in 
2020, by the pension revaluation index, the revaluation formula 
established in the current legislation), unemployment benefits (which 
depend mainly on changes in the unemployment rate) and interest (which 
changes according to the level of government debt and interest rates).
8  Moreover, the preliminary Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) data for 
2018 Q2 estimate the Spanish economy’s output growth in the period to 
have been 0.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms. This is 0.1 pp lower than 
expected in the June projections, which also has a negative impact on 
the average GDP growth rate for the year as a whole.
9  Nevertheless, in the case of certain demand components (investment in 
capital goods, in particular), the preliminary estimate from the second 
quarter QNA was a positive surprise, with an automatic effect of the 
same sign on average annual growth rates in 2018, tending to offset the 
adverse impact of the new assumptions for this year.
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underpinned by the favourable labour market performance, the 
steady improvement in households’ financial wealth (assisted by 
the gradual deleveraging process) and the continued favourable 
financial conditions, in terms both of the availability and the cost 
of borrowed funds, reflected in the growing proportion of credit‑
based consumer spending.10 In addition, especially in the near 
term, households’ current expenditure will benefit from the positive 
effect on households’ income of the entry into force of various 
budgetary measures contained in the State budget for 2018, such 
as the salary increase for public sector employees, the more 
dynamic employment performance in the general government 
sector or the decisions adopted on revaluation of pensions. 
Nevertheless, private consumption is expected to decelerate over 
the projection horizon, as the result of a combination of a variety of 
factors. First, the projected slowdown in GDP will, naturally, be 
accompanied by slower employment generation. Second, 
although in terms of labour income growth the projected 
acceleration in real wages will tend to offset the lower employment 
momentum expected, the composition of that labour income 
growth over the projection horizon will tend to become less 
favourable to household expenditure than it was in the past, given 
that, on the evidence available, consumer spending tends to be 
less responsive when a given increase in labour income stems 
from rising real wages rather than from rising employment. Lastly, 
the reversal of some of the factors that have driven down the 
saving rate in recent years will also help to moderate the pace of 
growth of private consumption.11
Residential investment is set to continue to record high rates of 
growth, against a backdrop of continued highly favourable 
conditions for taking out mortgages. However, some deceleration 
in this demand component is expected over the projection horizon, 
since the strong pace of growth in the recent period, combined 
with the decline in the saving rate, has led to the emergence of 
household net borrowing (albeit on a small scale). In the projection 
period, the increase in saving and the lower momentum of 
residential investment will allow household net borrowing to 
stabilise around its current levels. Business investment will be 
encouraged by the plentiful generation of internal funds and the 
availability of low‑cost funding, but this component will also 
decelerate somewhat, in keeping with the lower final demand 
momentum. In addition, the heightened uncertainty about the 
global economy will also tend to hold back non‑financial 
corporations’ investment decisions.
Sales of non‑tourism goods and services to the rest of the world are 
expected to grow relatively moderately over the projection horizon, in 
keeping with the deterioration of the outlook for foreign markets. 
Nevertheless, exports of these products should continue to grow 
slightly faster than their destination markets, as a result of the increase 
in the number of firms which, once they have begun to export to a 
certain market, are able to continue to do so years later and to 
substantially increase the volumes sold. As for exports of tourism 
services, after the recent slowdown linked to the recovery of various 
alternative destinations and, to a lesser extent, to the signs of 
saturation in certain areas of Spain, rates of growth are expected to 
stabilise over the projection horizon.12 Lastly, in the case of imports, it 
continues to be assumed that they will grow at a slightly slower pace 
than their historical relationship with final demand would warrant. 
Employment will continue to record the high growth rates that are 
customary in upturns in the Spanish economy, allowing the 
unemployment rate to drop somewhat below 12% by the end of 
the projection horizon.
The economy’s net lending position, which in 2017 amounted to 
2% of GDP, will decline this year to around 1.3% and is expected 
to remain close to that figure over the rest of the projection horizon. 
This moderation in the external balance, concentrated on the 
balance of goods and services, would be as a result both of the 
deterioration observed this year in net trade flows in real terms and 
the deterioration in terms of trade, against a backdrop of rising oil 
prices. It is estimated that the budget deficit could amount to 2.8% 
of GDP this year, 0.1  pp more than envisaged in the June 
projections, given that the slowdown in activity in the final stretch 
of the year is expected to affect the strength of tax bases and, 
therefore, tax revenue. In subsequent years, under the assumptions 
described above and the favourable cyclical conditions, the budget 
deficit may be expected to experiment a further slight decline.
The current projections for consumer prices point to a gradual 
increase in core inflation, measured by the annual rate of change 
in the HICP excluding energy and food, from 1% in 2018 to 1.8% 
in 2020. This increase is consistent with the projected widening of 
the positive output gap, given that GDP is expected to grow above 
its potential rate throughout the projection period. From the cost 
standpoint, it is estimated that wage growth will tend to accelerate 
as labour market slack decreases and in line with the 
recommendations of the Employment and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement for 2018‑2020 entered into by the social partners in 
June. This gradually increasing rate of growth in wages can be 
expected to pass through to unit labour costs, since no significant 
increase in productivity above its current low rates is expected 
over the projection period. In addition, it is estimated that profit 
margins (measured as the difference between the rates of growth 
of the GDP deflator and unit labour costs) will stabilise. External 
inflationary pressures, which have been high in 2018 as a result of 
higher oil prices, should moderate significantly in coming quarters, 
in keeping with the path of oil prices on the futures markets, an 
effect that will dominate the expected trajectory of consumer 
prices in the period. Overall, the HICP is expected to rise by 1.8% 
this year, peaking in Q3, before starting to decelerate, to reach 
1.7% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
10  See Box  7 (Recent developments in the consumer credit market in 
Spain) in this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
11  See Box  5 (The household saving rate in Spain: developments and 
outlook) in this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
12  See Box 6 (The slowdown in non-resident tourism in 2018 to date) in 
this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
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The risks to the baseline scenario for growth in activity are on the 
downside. On the external front, two of the risks identified in 
previous projection exercises – the adverse repercussions of the 
US economic policy mix on global financial conditions and the 
application of trade protectionism measures – have started to 
materialise and have already had an impact on the baseline 
scenario, triggering a downward revision of the ECB staff 
projections for GDP growth worldwide and for the euro area and 
of the Banco de España’s projections for the Spanish economy. 
However, it is still possible that these two elements may have a 
more negative impact in the future. Other external risk factors for 
the Spanish economy are a hypothetical “no deal” outcome from 
the ongoing negotiations between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union to establish the framework for their future 
relations and for the transition period, and also the possible 
resurgence of concerns regarding the future trajectory of Italian 
budgetary policy.
On the domestic front, there is still a high level of uncertainty regarding 
the future economic policy stance, in view of the current parliamentary 
fragmentation. In addition, a hypothetical increase in uncertainty 
associated with the tense political situation in Catalonia poses an 
added risk to economic growth, particularly in Catalonia itself.
The limited progress made to date in the necessary process of 
correcting the high level of public debt remains an important 
element of vulnerability. Against the present backdrop of fiscal 
policy uncertainty, it should be stressed that decisions on spending 
instruments and public revenue must be compatible with the need 
to reduce public debt and to create some headroom for the 
introduction of stabilising fiscal policy measures should the 
macroeconomic situation deteriorate. In addition, the instruments 
to be used to underpin the necessary fiscal consolidation process 
should minimise, insofar as possible, any potential adverse effects 
on economic growth.
Moreover, it is also necessary to reinstate a structural reform 
agenda, to boost the efficiency of the main factor and product 
markets. This agenda should have two main priorities: first, to 
correct aspects of the judicial and institutional framework that are 
sapping the Spanish economy’s growth potential; and second, to 
preserve the regulatory measures that were introduced in response 
to the crisis, which have underpinned the strength of the recovery 
and have, via competitiveness gains, made it compatible with an 
external surplus and strong job creation. 
The risks to inflation in the baseline scenario are slightly on the 
downside, as a consequence of a hypothetical materialisation of 
the risks of the same sign weighing on activity. By contrast, if any 
of the currently latent geopolitical conflicts were to intensify, the 
prices of imported goods, and especially of energy inputs, could 
rise, with the consequent upward impact on consumer prices. 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
